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This paper examines the interplay between the real and financial decisions of the competitive firm under output price 
uncertainty. The firm faces additional sources of uncertainty that are aggregated into a background risk. We show that 
the firm always chooses its optimal debt-equity ratio to minimize the weighted average cost of capital, irrespective of the 
risk attitude of the firm and the incidence of the underlying uncertainty. We further show that the firm's optimal input 
mix depends on its optimal debt-equity ratio, thereby rendering the interdependence of the real and financial decisions of 
the firm. When the background risk is either additive or multiplicative, we provide reasonable restrictions on the firm's 
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The seminal work of Sandmo (1971) has inspired a great number of papers examining the theory of
the competitive ﬁrm under output price uncertainty (see, e.g., Turnovsky, 1973; Batra and Ullah,
1974; Hartman, 1976; Chavas, 1985; Wong, 1996; to name just a few). In all these studies, it
is implicitly assumed that the competitive ﬁrm is all-equity ﬁnanced. This assumption may be
innocuous in a perfect world in which Modigliani and Miller (1958) assert that the choice of capital
structure (i.e., the mix of debt and equity) is a matter of irrelevance to the ﬁrm. A corollary to this
irrelevance theorem is that the real and ﬁnancial decisions of the ﬁrm are independent and therefore
can be made separately.
In the real world, imperfections such as corporate and personal taxation, bankruptcy costs, infor-
mation asymmetries, and agency costs are a fact of life, thereby making the celebrated Modigliani-
Miller theorem fragile.1 The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the theory of the competitive
ﬁrm under output price uncertainty when the real and ﬁnancial decisions of the ﬁrm are de facto
interdependent. To this end, we modify the tax-adjusted valuation model of Modigliani and Miller
(1963) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and place it in the context of the competitive ﬁrm under
output price uncertainty `a l a Sandmo (1971) and Batra and Ullah (1974). The model is further
complicated to shed light on how additional sources of uncertainty, aggregated into a background
risk, aﬀect the behavior of the ﬁrm.
Irrespective of the risk attitude of the ﬁrm and the incidence of the underlying uncertainty, we
show that the ﬁrm always chooses its optimal debt-equity ratio to minimize the weighted average
cost of capital. We further show that the ﬁrm’s optimal input mix depends on its optimal debt-
equity ratio, thereby rendering the interdependence of the real and ﬁnancial decisions of the ﬁrm.
Myers (1974), Hite (1977), Cooper and Franks (1983), Dotan and Ravid (1985), and Dammon and
Senbet (1988) establish similar interactions between corporate investment and ﬁnancing decisions,
albeit without considering the risk attitudes of ﬁrms.
Even though the introduction of the background risk has no eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s optimal debt-
1The eﬀects of market imperfections on the Modigliani-Miller theorem have been studied by numerous papers.
Notable examples are Modigliani and Miller (1963), Miller (1977), and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) on corporate
and personal taxation; Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), and Brennan and Schwartz (1978) on bankruptcy
costs; Myers and Majluf (1984), Narayanan (1988), and Noe (1988) on information asymmetries; Jensen and Meckling
(1976), and Barnea et al. (1981) on agency costs.
2equity ratio and the marginal rate of technical substitution, it does aﬀect the input mix chosen, and
the amounts of debt and equity issued, by the ﬁrm. When the background risk is either additive or
multiplicative, we show that the ﬁrm optimally produces less in the presence of the background risk
if its preferences exhibit risk vulnerability in the sense of Gollier and Pratt (1996) or multiplicative
risk vulnerability in the sense of Franke et al. (2006), respectively. Furthermore, if capital is a
normal input, the ﬁrm acquires less capital by issuing less debt and equity upon the introduction of
the background risk.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop a model of the
competitive ﬁrm under output price uncertainty, which fully integrates the production and ﬁnancing
decisions of the ﬁrm. Section 3 characterizes the ﬁrm’s optimal input mix and ﬁnancing mix when
additional sources of uncertainty, aggregated into a background risk, are present. Section 4 examines
the economic implications of the background risk on the production and ﬁnancing decisions of the
ﬁrm. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider the one-period model of the competitive ﬁrm under output price uncertainty `a l a Sandmo
(1971) and Batra and Ullah (1974). The ﬁrm produces a single commodity according to a known
production function, Q(K,L), where K is the amount of capital stock and L is the quantity of
labor input. We assume that the production function, Q(K,L), is strictly concave in K and L,
i.e., QK(K,L) > 0, QL(K,L) > 0, QKK(K,L) < 0, QLL(K,L) < 0, and QKK(K,L)QLL(K,L) −
QKL(K,L)2 > 0, where subscripts denotes partial derivatives. We further assume that isoquants of
Q(K,L) are convex to the origin so that QL(K,L)2QKK(K,L)−2QK(K,L)QL(K,L)QKL(K,L)+
QK(K,L)2QLL(K,L) < 0 (see Silberberg and Suen, 2001). At the end of the period, the ﬁrm sells
its entire output, Q(K,L), at a per-unit price, ˜ P. When the ﬁrm makes its production decision at
the beginning of the period, it regards ˜ P as a positive random variable.3
To ﬁnance the acquisition of capital, K, at the beginning of the period, the ﬁrm issues debt and
equity to raise the amounts, D and E, respectively. The ﬁrm’s initial balance sheet is, therefore,
2Bear (1965) deﬁnes a normal (an inferior) input as one for which an increase in output price results in increased
(decreased) utilization of that input.
3Throughout the paper, a tilde (∼)a l w a y ss i g n i ﬁ e sar a n d o mv a r i a b l e .
3given by
K = D + E, (1)
where we have normalized the price of capital to unity for simplicity. We assume that the economic
rate of capital depreciation equals one, thereby yielding zero salvage value of capital at the end of
the period. Labor, L, is hired at a known wage rate, w, at the beginning of the period. The total
labor costs, wL, will be paid out of the ﬁrm’s revenues, ˜ PQ(K,L), at the end of the period.
We assume that the cost of debt comprises a default risk premium that is positively related to
the ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio. Throughout the paper, we consider only the case that the ﬁrm never
defaults on its debt (i.e., D is suﬃciently small). However, due to a lack of bargaining power, the
ﬁrm has to encounter a pre-speciﬁed schedule of interest rate, rd(λ), where λ = D/E is the ﬁrm’s
debt-equity ratio, r￿
d(λ) > 0, and r￿￿
d(λ) > 0. Since shareholders are residual claimants, the cost of
equity also contains a default risk premium that is positively related to the ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio
(see Scott, 1976), and is higher than the cost of debt. Let 1 + re(λ) be the cost of equity such that
re(λ) >r d(λ), r￿
e(λ) > 0, and r￿￿
e(λ) > 0.
Interest costs of debt are fully tax-deductible so that the ﬁrm’s tax liability at the end of the
period is given by
˜ T = t[ ˜ PQ(K,L) − wL− δK − rd(λ)D], (2)
where t ∈ (0,1) is a constant corporate income tax rate, and δ ∈ [0,1) is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc rate of
capital depreciation for tax purposes. Thus, the ﬁrm’s end-of-period cash ﬂow that is accrued to
existing shareholders is given by
˜ W = ˜ PQ(K,L) − wL− ˜ T − [1 + rd(λ)]D − [1 + re(λ)]E, (3)
where the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (3) give the ﬁrm’s operating proﬁts, the
third term is the corporate income taxes, the fourth term is the total costs of debt, and the last
term is the total costs of equity.
The ﬁrm possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(W,Z), deﬁned over its end-
of-period cash ﬂow that is accrued to existing shareholders, W, and other sources of uncertainty that
are aggregated into a single random variable, ˜ Z, hereafter referred to as background risk. The ﬁrm is
risk averse so that UW(W,Z) > 0 and UWW(W,Z) < 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
4Before any uncertainty is resolved, the ﬁrm chooses an input mix, (K,L), and a ﬁnancing mix,
(D,E), so as to maximize its expected utility:
max
K,L,D,E
E[U( ˜ W, ˜ Z)] s.t.K = D + E, (4)
where E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the joint probability distribution function of
˜ P and ˜ Z, and ˜ W is deﬁned in Eq. (3).
3 Solution to the Model
Substituting Eqs. (1) and (2) into Eq. (3) yields
˜ W =( 1− t)[ ˜ PQ(K,L) − wL] − [1 + rk(λ) − tδ]K, (5)






















The second equality in Eq. (6) follows from Eq. (1). Inspection of Eq. (6) reveals that the ﬁrm’s
WACC is indeed a function of λ only.
We can equivalently state Program (4) as
max
K,L,λ
E[U( ˜ W, ˜ Z)], (7)
where ˜ W is deﬁned in Eq. (5).4 The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for Program (7) are given by
E{UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)[(1 − t) ˜ PQK(K∗,L ∗) − 1 − rk(λ∗)+tδ]} =0 , (8)
E{UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)(1 − t)[ ˜ PQL(K∗,L ∗) − w]} =0 , (9)
and
−E[UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)]r￿
k(λ∗)=0 , (10)
4The balance sheet identity, Eq. (1), has been substituted into ˜ W by means of λ,a si se v i d e n tf r o mE q .( 5 ) ,w h e r e
D = λK/(λ +1 )a n dE = K/(λ +1 )s ot h a tD + E = K.
5where an asterisk (∗) denotes an optimal level.
Since E[UW( ˜ W, ˜ Z)] > 0, Eq. (10) reduces to r￿
k(λ∗) = 0, thereby invoking our ﬁrst proposition.5
Proposition 1: The ﬁrm’s optimal debt-equity ratio, λ∗, is the one that minimizes the ﬁrm’s WACC.
Proposition 1 states that the ﬁrm’s optimal debt-equity ratio, λ∗, depends neither on the ﬁrm’s
risk attitude nor on the ﬁrm’s input mix, (K∗,L ∗). This optimal debt-equity ratio is governed solely
by the ﬁrm’s WACC, rk(λ), which is a function of the after-tax cost of debt, (1 − t)rd(λ), and the
cost of equity, re(λ). However, the ﬁrm’s optimal amount of debt, D∗ = λ∗K∗/(λ∗ +1), and that of
equity, E∗ = K∗/(λ∗ + 1), do depend on the amount of capital, K∗, optimally chosen by the ﬁrm.
From Proposition 1, we know that λ∗ is the one that minimizes rk(λ). The ﬁrm’s optimal input
mix, (K∗,L ∗), is thus determined by solving Eqs. (8) and (9) simultaneously. Rearranging terms of
Eq. (8), we have
E[UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z) ˜ P](1 − t)QK(K∗,L ∗)=E [ UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)][1 + rk(λ∗) − tδ]. (11)
Likewise, rearranging terms of Eq. (9) yields
E[UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z) ˜ P](1 − t)QL(K∗,L ∗)=E [ UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)](1 − t)w. (12)







where the left-hand side of Eq. (13) is the marginal rate of technical substitution. Hence, we
establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The real and ﬁnancial decisions of the ﬁrm are integrated in that the marginal rate
of technical substitution equals the ratio of the marginal cost of capital and the tax-adjusted wage
rate at the optimum.
Eq. (13) states that the ﬁrm equates the marginal rate of technical substitution, which is the
ratio of the marginal product of capital and the marginal product of labor, to the ratio of the
marginal cost of capital and the tax-adjusted wage rate at the optimum. Since the marginal cost of
5All proofs of propositions are relegated to the appendix.
6capital depends on the optimal debt-equity ratio, λ∗, the real and ﬁnancial decisions of the ﬁrm are
indeed integrated.
4 The Eﬀect of Background Risk on Firm Behavior
In this section, we examine how the presence of background risk aﬀects the behavior of the ﬁrm.
To this end, we restrict our attention to two special cases: (1) additive background risk in that the
ﬁrm’s utility function is given by U(W + Z), and (2) multiplicative background risk in that the
ﬁrm’s utility function is given by U[W(1 + Z)]. The additive background risk can be interpreted as
random initial wealth (see, e.g., Kihlstrom et al., 1981; Chavas, 1985; Wong, 1996; Battermann et
al., 2008), whereas the multiplicative background risk can be interpreted as inﬂation risk (see, e.g.,
Adam-M¨ uller, 2000, 2002). In either case, the background risk, ˜ Z, has zero mean and is independent
of the output price risk, ˜ P.
Deﬁne the following derived utility function:
V (W)=E Z[U(W + ˜ Z)], (14)
in the case of additive background risk, or
V (W)=E Z{U[W(1 + ˜ Z)]}, (15)
in the case of multiplicative background risk, where EZ(·) is the expectation operator with respect
to the probability distribution function of ˜ Z. Using either Eq. (14) or Eq. (15), and applying the
law of iterated expectations, we can state Program (7) as
max
K,L,λ
E[V ( ˜ W)], (16)




E[U( ˜ W)], (17)
where ˜ W is deﬁned in Eq. (5). Inspection of Programs (16) and (17) reveals that the eﬀect of
introducing ˜ Z on the behavior of the ﬁrm is equivalent to that of replacing the utility function,
U(W), by the derived utility function, V (W).
7It is reasonable to believe that the two utility functions, U(W) and V (W), are closely related.
However, the theory of risk aversion developed by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) is too weak to
oﬀer an intuitive linkage between U(W) and V (W). To resolve this problem, Gollier and Pratt
(1996) introduce the concept of “risk vulnerability” for the case of additive background risk, while
Franke et al. (2006) introduce the concept of “multiplicative risk vulnerability” for the other case of
multiplicative background risk, both of which describe preferences under which the derived utility
function, V (W), is more risk averse than the original utility function, U(W), in the usual Arrow-Pratt
sense, i.e., −V ￿￿(W)/V ￿(W) > −U￿￿(W)/U￿(W) for all W. Gollier and Pratt (1996) show that U(W)
is risk vulnerable if the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, −U￿￿(W)/U￿(W), is decreasing
and convex in W. On the other hand, Franke et al. (2006) show that U(W) is multiplicatively risk
vulnerable if the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, −WU￿￿(W)/U￿(W), is increasing
and convex in W, and is everywhere less than unity.
Equipped with the concepts of risk vulnerability and multiplicative risk vulnerability, we recog-
nize that the eﬀect of the presence of additive background risk or multiplicative background risk on
the behavior of the ﬁrm is qualitatively equivalent to that of increased risk aversion. Following Di-
amond and Stiglitz (1974), we work with a diﬀerentiable family of utility functions, U(W,ρ), where
ρ is an ordinal index of risk aversion. Given this notation, Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) show that
an increase in ρ represents an increase in risk aversion if, and only if, the Arrow-Pratt measure of










UW(W,ρ)2 > 0. (18)
We perform the comparative static exercise with respect to ρ, and report the results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3: If the ﬁrm’s preferences are risk vulnerable (multiplicatively risk vulnerable), intro-
ducing the additive (multiplicative) background risk induces the ﬁrm to produce less. Furthermore,
if capital is a normal input, the ﬁrm acquires less capital by issuing less debt and equity in the
presence of the additive (multiplicative) background risk.
According to Bear (1965), capital is said to be a normal input if an increase in the output price
increases the utilization of capital. It is the case when the production function, Q(K,L), satisﬁes
that QL(K,L)QKL(K,L)−QK(K,L)QLL(K,L) > 0. Proposition 3 is consistent with the consensus
in the literature that uncertainty is output-reducing (see, e.g., Sandmo, 1971; Batra and Ullah, 1974;
8Chavas, 1985; and Wong, 1996).
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the interaction between the production and ﬁnancing decisions of the
competitive ﬁrm under output price uncertainty. The ﬁrm faces additional sources of uncertainty
that are aggregated into a background risk. We have shown that the ﬁrm always chooses its optimal
debt-equity ratio to minimize the weighted average cost of capital, irrespective of the risk attitude
of the ﬁrm and the incidence of the underlying uncertainty. Even though the introduction of the
background risk has no eﬀects on the ﬁrm’s optimal debt-equity ratio and the marginal rate of
technical substitution, it does aﬀect the input mix chosen, and the amounts of debt and equity
issued, by the ﬁrm. When the background risk is either additive or multiplicative, we have shown
that the ﬁrm optimally produces less in the presence of the background risk if its preferences are
risk vulnerable (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) or multiplicatively risk vulnerable (Franke et al., 2006),
respectively. Furthermore, if capital is a normal input, we have shown that the ﬁrm optimally
acquires less capital by issuing less debt and equity upon the introduction of the background risk.
From the work on monotone comparative statics (see Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; and Athey,
2002), there is a general result that any comparative statics that hold for the portfolio problem of
a risk-averse investor will automatically hold for the production problem of a risk-averse ﬁrm. In
light of this result, the method advanced in this paper should be applicable to many other choice
problems under multiple sources of uncertainty.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Diﬀerentiating Eq. (6) with respect to λ twice and evaluating the resulting










e(λ∗)} > 0, (A.1)
where we have used the fact that r￿(λ∗) = 0, and the inequality follows from r￿
d(λ) > 0, r￿￿
d(λ) > 0,
and r￿￿
e(λ) > 0. As is evident from Eq. (A.1), the second order condition that λ∗ minimizes rk(λ)i s
satisﬁed. ✷
9Proof of Proposition 2: It remains to show that the solution, (K∗,L ∗), satisﬁes the second-order
suﬃcient conditions for Program (7). Note that
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)]
∂K2 =E {UWW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)[(1 − t) ˜ PQK(K∗,L ∗) − 1 − rk(λ∗)+tδ]2}
+E[UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)(1 − t) ˜ PQKK(K∗,L ∗)] < 0, (A.2)
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)]
∂L2 =E {UWW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)(1 − t)2[ ˜ PQL(K∗,L ∗) − w]2}
+E[UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)(1 − t) ˜ PQLL(K∗,L ∗)] < 0, (A.3)
and
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)]
∂K∂L
=E {UWW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)[(1 − t) ˜ PQK(K∗,L ∗) − 1 − rk(λ∗)+tδ]
×(1 − t)[ ˜ PQL(K∗,L ∗) − w]} +E [ UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)(1 − t) ˜ PQKL(K∗,L ∗)], (A.4)
where the inequalities follow from the assumptions on U(W,Z) and Q(K,L). Using Eq. (13), we
can write Eqs. (A.2) and (A.4) as
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)]





+E[UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)(1 − t) ˜ PQKK(K∗,L ∗)], (A.5)
and
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)]
∂K∂L





+E[UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)(1 − t) ˜ PQKL(K∗,L ∗)]. (A.6)
Using Eqs. (A.3), (A.5), and (A.6), we have
∆ =
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)]
∂K2 ×
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)]
∂L2 −
￿
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)]
∂K∂L
￿2
=E {UWW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z)[ ˜ PQL(K∗,L ∗) − w]2}E[UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z) ˜ P](1 − t)3
×
￿












10+E[UW( ˜ W∗, ˜ Z) ˜ P](1 − t)2[QKK(K∗,L ∗)QLL(K∗,L ∗) − QKL(K∗,L ∗)2] > 0, (A.7)
where the inequality follows from the assumptions on U(W,Z) and Q(K,L). As is evident from
Eqs. (A.2), (A.3), and (A.7), the solution, (K∗,L ∗) satisﬁes the second-order suﬃcient conditions
for Program (7). ✷
Proof of Proposition 3: We replace the utility function in program (7) with the diﬀerentiable family
of utility functions, U(W,ρ). From Proposition 1, the optimal debt-equity ratio, λ∗, does not depend
on the ﬁrm’s preferences. The ﬁrm’s optimal input mix, (K∗,L ∗), is governed by solving Eqs. (8)
and (9) simultaneously, where U(W,Z) is replaced by U(W,ρ). Totally diﬀerentiating Eqs. (8) and








































where ∂2E[U( ˜ W∗,ρ)]/∂L2 < 0, ∂2E[U( ˜ W∗,ρ)]/∂K2 < 0, ∂2E[U( ˜ W∗,ρ)]/∂K∂L, and ∆ > 0 are
given by Eqs. (A.3), (A.5), (A.6), and (A.7), respectively, with U(W,Z) replaced by U(W,ρ),
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗,ρ)]
∂K∂ρ




=E [ UWρ( ˜ W∗,ρ)(1 − t)( ˜ PQL(K∗,L ∗) − w)]. (A.11)










Let J(W,ρ)=UWρ(W,ρ)/UW(W,ρ). Note ﬁrst that
JW(W,ρ)=
UW(W,ρ)UWWρ(W,ρ) − UWρ(W,ρ)UWW(W,ρ)
UW(W,ρ)2 < 0, (A.13)
where the inequality follows from Eq. (18). Deﬁne ¯ W∗ as ˜ W∗ evaluated at ˜ P = w/QL(K∗,L ∗).
Using J(W,ρ) and Eq. (9), we can write Eq. (A.11) as
∂2E[U( ˜ W∗,ρ)]
∂L∂ρ
=E {[J( ˜ W∗,ρ) − J( ¯ W∗,ρ)]UW( ˜ W∗,ρ)(1 − t)[ ˜ PQL(K∗,L ∗) − w]}. (A.14)
11Since J(W,ρ) is decreasing in W from Eq. (A.13) and ˜ W∗ is increasing in P, the sign of J( ˜ W∗,ρ)−
J( ¯ W∗,ρ) must be opposite to that of ˜ PQL(K∗,L ∗) − w. Thus, the right-hand side of Eq. (A.14) is
unambiguously negative so that ∂2E[U( ˜ W∗,ρ)]/∂L∂ρ < 0.









×[QL(K∗,L ∗)QKL(K∗,L ∗) − QK(K∗,L ∗)QLL(K∗,L ∗)]. (A.15)









×[QK(K∗,L ∗)QKL(K∗,L ∗) − QL(K∗,L ∗)QKK(K∗,L ∗)]. (A.16)
Totally diﬀerentiating Q(K∗,L ∗)w i t hr e s p e c tt oρ yields
dQ(K∗,L ∗)
dρ
= QK(K∗,L ∗) ×
dK∗
dρ











2QK(K∗,L ∗)QL(K∗,L ∗)QKL(K∗,L ∗)
−QL(K∗,L ∗)2QKK(K∗,L ∗) − QK(K∗,L ∗)2QLL(K∗,L ∗)
￿
, (A.17)
where the second equality follows from Eqs. (A.15) and (A.16). Since ∂2E[U( ˜ W∗,ρ)]/∂L∂ρ < 0, it
follows from the assumptions on Q(K,L) and Eq. (A.17) that dQ(K∗,L ∗)/dρ < 0.
If capital is a normal input, we have QL(K,L)QKL(K,L) − QK(K,L)QLL(K,L) > 0 (see
Bear, 1965). Since ∂2E[U( ˜ W∗,ρ)]/∂L∂ρ < 0, Eq. (A.15) implies that dK∗/dρ < 0. Since
D∗ = λ∗K∗/(λ∗ + 1) and E∗ = K∗/(λ∗ + 1), it follows from Proposition 1 and dK∗/dρ < 0
that dD∗/dρ < 0 and dE∗/dρ < 0. ✷
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